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Abstract
Real-world problems are characterized by a high-information load in the sense that they are informationally demanding and
computationally intractable. Humans, however, are capable of handling these high-cognitive-load problems, despite the 
complexity and the large number of possibilities. In this paper, we investigate the aspects of this intractability and limits, in the 
light of a quantitative measure of uncertainty. Through the evaluation of the entropic behavior of a cognitive process evolving
over time, we provide an insight on the relations between cognitive complexity and the extent to which solutions could be found.
The results include a cognitive model that is suitable for the analysis of graphical representations of cognition, as well as its
evolution and convergence with respect to uncertainty. We also propose an interpretation of the complexity of a cognitive
process, based on the uncertainty and prove that the larger the cognitive space is, and the more uncertain the evolution of the
process can be, despite the certainty of the final outcome.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
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1. Introduction
One of the main characteristics of real-world cognition is the high-information load one is facing, in the sense 
that the given tasks are informationally demanding and computationally intractable. However, humans are capable
of handling these high-cognitive-load problems, despite the complexity and the large number of possibilities [1]. In
the context of several cognitive problems, for instance the Frame Problem [2], the Infinite Regress problem [3], as
well as in the case of Bounded Rationality [4], we argue that the limits of human cognition is due to the infinite
number of concepts that are made available.
In this paper, we attempt to prove this claim by drawing a relation between uncertainty and cognition in
situations subject to an infinite number of co-activated concepts. The relation is made in the sense that uncertainty is
involved in the cognitive task, with regard to the solution to be found and the evolution of the process. More
precisely, we investigate the reasons of this intractability and limits, in the light of a quantitative measure of 
uncertainty. Through the evaluation of the entropic behavior of a cognitive process evolving over time, we provide
an insight on the relations between cognitive complexity and the extent to which solutions could be found. We
analytically show that under such assumption of large cognitive space, the uncertainty of the overall cognitive
process will keep on increasing, even though we attain complete certainty in the final stage of the process.
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To this end, we propose a cognitive model with a graphical representation inspired from the work of [5] on 
heuristics. In his model, the organization of the mental concepts has a graph-like structure, and where the cognition 
is done through a mechanism of activation or priming of the given concepts. Several viewpoints have been 
presented in literature addressing different aspects of the problem of cognition, and how the concept of infinity 
arises and affects it. For instance, the frame problem refers to a problem where a cognitive agent faces an infinite 
supply of potentially relevant and irrelevant information, and has to process relevant information in an adaptive and 
intelligent manner. 
The problem of finding the relevant information while ignoring everything else is the main scope of the frame 
problem. The issue of framing is a ubiquitous problem in real life, and could be found in rationality, politics, ethics, 
especially in situations subject to a high-cognitive load [6]. Another related situation is the epistemological problem 
of the infinite regress problem [3] which generally rises in any situation where a statement has to be justified. 
Herein, we relate to the same problem, and more precisely on how knowledge is added over time and how it affects 
the uncertainty of the overall cognitive process. By mirroring the notion of infinite regress with the process of 
conceptualization and association, we can think about the cases where the agent is neither constrained by time nor 
stopped by the undecidability of a problem. In this case, he will have to face an infinite number of concepts, which 
makes the problem intractable, and eventually with complex associations. It is with regard to these limits of human 
cognition that we evaluate the entropic behavior of a cognitive process evolving over time. Hence, we provide an 
insight on the relations between cognitive complexity and the extent to which solutions could be found. We prove 
that the larger the cognitive space is, and the more uncertain the evolution of the process can be, despite the 
certainty of the final outcome. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as following. In section 2, we propose our cognitive model for the 
representation of concepts. In section 3, we describe the evolution of the process as well as the characteristics of 
entropy given an infinite graph of concepts. In section 4, we discussion and interpret the results. In section 5, we 
conclude and outline the future work. 
2. The cognitive model 
2.1. The concepts 
concepts in his view of conceptual cognition, namely the perceptual symbol systems (PSS) view of cognition [7]. 
Our reliance on this view is justified to the extent that it is related to the file model of cognition. According to the 
file model, concepts refer to files that contain information, such as representations and beliefs about the concept per 
se, or more precisely about the entities in the concepts extensions. We adopt a similar representational system, in the 
sense that a concept is a general type, category or class, which can undergo any number of conceptualization with 
different representations. For instance, a flower can be conceptualized in several ways with regard to its shape, 
color, texture, smell, etc. Thus, different representations will be activated depending on the context and goals of the 
agent. Once these concepts are established in the cognitive space (or memory) of the agent, knowledge is 
accumulated and added to the system. This process is reinforced through new experiences and beliefs update. 
2.2. The associations 
The associations between the concepts will be used to make inferences on the basis of the availability of beliefs 
related to the concepts and their representations. We can think about it from the perspective of the file model, as a 
file system where each file is labeled and additionally contains notes about the concept. The number of files and 
their underlying notes can be infinite, although this number could be bounded if the agent has to consider only few 
concepts in his perceptual or cognitive frame. This does not mean, however, that the agent cannot accumulate a 
large number of concepts, especially when the given cognitive task is performed over a long period of time. The 
association are to be understood as the type of assessments that assign causal relations between activated concepts 
when the agent is facing a problem.  It could be thought of as the connections between concepts triggered by the 
usage of natural language. For instance, thinking about the concept of a plane, might activate other concepts like the 
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crew, pilots or luggage [5]. This type of associations is the one we are about to model, based on a graphical 
representation, as it is the most intuitive and trivial representation. Next, we attempt to characterize this situation 
from the certainty standpoint. 
2.3. The formal model 
Formally, we adopt a graph representation for the concepts and the associations, and assume that the cognitive 
process operates on this graph. However, unlike the usage of directed graphs in [5], we assume our representation is 
undirected, since we are only interested in the complexity of the conceptual graph rather then the pertinence of its 
underlying concepts. Since the cognitive process is evolving throughout time, the graph will be indexed by t, as in 
(1) : 
Gt = (Vt, Et) (1) 
where at time t, the nodes Vt represent the concepts, and the edges Et represent the associations between the 
concepts. Our cognitive model will be concretized as an Erdõs-Rényi Random Graph [9], characterized by the 
degree distribution Pan,b defined over N concepts. The parameterization values a, b and n will be justified later for 
treating the asymptotic case and the entropy. We note that building our graphs from a general and parameterized 
degree distribution has the property of making the number of edges (associations) fluctuate according to the 
parameters a, b and n. Thus, it will be devoted to elaborating the characteristics of the cognitive processes with 
regard to uncertainty and the behavior of entropy. To this end, we begin by defining a cognitive process as follows. 
 
Definition 1. A cognitive process P operates on a graph of concepts Gt, where concepts and associations are 
added and updated dynamically by the agent. P is a stochastic process defined by Pan,b as in (2). 
 
}|)({ , TttPP ban  (2) 
 
We note that during this process, the agent observers an objective world, and constructs his own model of it, 
namely Gt, or the object of the process P. We take the hypothesis that the agent is observing an objective, external 
set of an infinite number of concepts represented by an infinite random graph, i.e. an objective cognitive space 
defined as following. 
 
Definition 2. The objective cognitive space E is the graph G = (V, E) of the real objective concepts available to 
the agent, who builds his subjective cognitive graph from it. The size of E is N = |V|, and tends to infinity. 
 
The graph Gt E. We also 
notice that the agent has a frame, or a window, within which he can identify and represent the graspable concepts. 
We define it as following. 
 
Definition 3.  
( . The agent is building F by adding more concepts and associations as time goes on. 
 
Another notion we will use is the notion of associative potential of an agent, defined as following. 
 
Definition 4. For a given cognitive task, the associative potential, namely k, is the maximal number of 
associations, that an agent could possibly make within his cognitive frame. 
 
The choice of the maximal number of associations is due to the fact that if the agent is capable of making an 
association between one concept and k other concepts, he can obviously build k k 
with the first concept. For instance, if agent 1 has an associative potential k1 and the agent 2 has an associative 
potential k2 with k2 > k1, then the agent 2 will have a higher capacity to create associations, especially if k1 = 1. As 
we will see in the next sections, the associative potential could also be defined as the rank of 1 in a deterministic 
degree distribution. 
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3. Certainty evolution 
In this section we start by describing the notion of convergence relative to a degree distribution, given the 
parametrization defined in (2). Then, we define the notion of degree distribution support which will be used to 
characterize the entropy measure. Finally, we present the analysis of the entropy of a cognitive process by showing 
the behavior of entropy whenever the support of the degree distribution of the underlying process is countably 
infinite. 
3.1. Conceptual graph convergence 
We assume that the convergence of conceptual graphs is mirrored by the convergence of its representative degree 
distribution. Therefore, we start by defining the distance between two degree distributions. For this, we could rely 
on the total variational distance as in (3). 
j
jjv PPPPD ||),( ,2,121  (3) 
where DV stands for the variational distance, and Pi,j is the jth element of Pi. For P1 and P2 having respectively 
different dimensions m1 and m2, (3) becomes (4). 
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We can also use the Kullback-Leibler divergence as in (5). 
)ln(),(
,2
,1
,121
j j
j
jKL P
P
PPPD  
(5) 
where we adopt the convention DKL(P1, P2) = 0 if P2,k = 0 but P1,k > 0 for some k. Moreover, based on the  
inequality [10] we have (6). 
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Both divergence (5) and the variational distance (3) can be used as measures of the difference between two degree 
distributions. However,  inequality has the important implication that for two degree distributions P1 and 
P2, if DKL(P1, P2) is small, then so is DV (P1, P2). Furthermore, for a sequence of degree distributions P(n), as , 
if DKL( P, P(n) , then DV (P, P(n) . In other words, the convergence in divergence is a stronger notion of 
convergence than the convergence in variational distance. Thus, we will use the convergence measures (5) as to 
define the continuity of the Shannon entropy, in the sense that we study the convergence of a sequence of degree 
distribution as well as their entropies. Given a sequence of degree distributions P(n), we can consider the sequential 
decision problem in which a Bayesian agent is observing an objective cognitive space E, and updating his subjective 
cognitive space represented by the conceptual graph Gt. The graph Gt is generated by the successive realizations of a 
discrete stochastic process {P(n)| n  T}, indexed by n, and where n varies over a time index set T . We assume that 
the process will converge to the limiting degree distribution Pl, as in (7). 
1)( PP n  (7) 
This notion of convergence reflects the idea that we expect to see the next degree distribution in P(n) to become 
better and better modeled by Pl. The yielded convergence is expressed by the limit (8). 
1)(
lim PPn n  
(8) 
(8) will be used to define the continuity of the Shannon entropy on degree distributions. 
3.2. Degree distribution entropy 
The Shannon entropy measures are functions mapping a probability distribution to a real value. They can be 
described as the measure of uncertainty about a discrete random variable X having a probability mass function p. 
We define it as following. 
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Definition 5. The entropy H(X) of a random variable X is 
x
xpxpXH )(log)()(  (9) 
Herein, summation is over the support of the considered degree distributions. Shannon entropy measures the 
spread of a probability distribution. In the case where the concepts are finite, the Shannon entropy measures are 
continuous function. We propose to focus on the case where the entropy measure is applied to degree distributions 
with a countably infinite set of concepts. The focus on the infinite case goes hand in hand with the motivations we 
have stated in the introduction. That is, the understanding highly complex cognition, concretized by a countably 
infinite number of concepts. We are interested in studying the continuity of (9) with respect to the distance measures 
we established in the section 3.1. For instance, entropy is discontinuous with respect to the Kullback-Leibler 
divergence [11]. We propose to define the continuity of a function f that will be lately extended into the entropy 
measure H. 
Definition 6.  Let k be the set of all possible degree distributions on N nodes, and let P  k.  
k  
P   k : DKL(P, P  | f (P . 
 
If f fails to be continuous at P, then we say that f is discontinuous at P. Given the notion of convergence we 
defined in section 3.1., we can provide the following definitions of the discontinuity of the function f. 
 
Definition 7.  k be the set of all possible degree distributions on N nodes. Let P  k. 
k (n)  k such 
that: 
0),(lim )( PPDn nKL  
(10) 
but f (P(n)) does not converge to f (P), i.e. 
)()(lim )( PfPfn n  
(11) 
3.3. Discontinuity 
In this section, we establish the discontinuity of H at any degree distribution having a countably infinite support. 
Let (12) be a sequence of degree distributions with the real parameters a > 1, b > 0 and n > a. We will use this 
sequence to show that H is discontinuous at P1 = (1, 0, 0,...). 
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Based on our definition of convergence in 3.1., we show that the sequence banP
,  converges to P1 =(1,0,0,...). 
Assuming that: 
b
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, , which is given in (14). 
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Then, the entropy banP
, is given by (15). 
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In order to compute the limit of (15), let 
 
As n approaches infinity, the limit of T1  
T2 can be written as in (17). 
 
Using  rule, we can show that 0lim 4Tn , while for T3, we have (18). 
 
Hence, 
 
From (19), we can provide the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. (19), we have: 
 
Thus, we can state that H is discontinuous at the degree distribution P1 = (1, 0, 0, ...). 
4. Discussion 
We start by describing the evolution of the cognitive process P with respect to its parametric degree distribution. 
Then, we provide an interpretation of the uncertainty of P, assuming that the number of concepts is countably 
infinite. We propose to use the same general degree sequence (12) provided in the previous section. 
At the beginning of the cognitive process (2), the agent can only grasp a small and limited number of concepts 
(nodes). Therefore, there is a low probability that a primed concept will have a high degree. This is due partially to 
the fact that the agent starts the cognitive process (at t = 0) with no prior associations between the concepts. As time 
goes on, the agent will start creating and adding associations between the concepts and the degrees of the nodes will 
start increasing. Thus, the likelihood of the existence of concepts with a high degree within the frame of the agent 
will increase. The reason for which we assumed that the degree distribution of the process is described by (12) is the 
possibility to define a dominant degree. In this case, one degree will occur with a probability which is higher than 
the probability of occurrence of the other degrees. For instance, the probability of the degree k in the general 
representation (22) will be equal to 1 for  In this situation, the associative potential of an agent is the rank of 
the ))log/(log1( bna , that is, k. 
 
We note that the first term bnan )log/(log/1 is repeated n times in (22), and the size of the sequence approaches 
infinity. From the asymptotic degree distribution (22) we can describe the evolution of the degrees in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Dominant ranks for k = 1 and k = 4 
deg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
P32,1 .36 .21 .21 .21 0 0 0 
P42,1 .5 .125 .125 .125 .125 0 0 
P52,1 .569 .086 .086 .086 .086 .086 0 
        
   . 
 
   
   .    
Pn,2,11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
or 
    
Pn,2,14 
      
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
        
 
For a = 2 and b = 1, and for different choices of the associative potentials (k = 1 or k = 4), the sequence will yield 
different deterministic distributions. For instance, k = 1 generates (23) and k = 3 yields (24). 
 
The sequence (23) converges to a deterministic distribution P1 = {1, 0, 0...} (similarly, (24) converges to P3 = {0, 0, 
1, 0, 0...}). Consequently, the representative graph Gn,1 having a degree distribution banP
,
1, will converge to a graph 
G1 described by P1. In case we take k = 1 as in (23), we get a Bipartite graph represented by P1. This case is not the 
most efficient one in the sense that the agent cannot build more then 1 association for a given concept, which means 
. As k increases, more associations will be created and added, and 
the more k tends to the maximal degree, i.e., the number of nodes N. If k = n+1, then the graph has n+1 nodes with 
n+1 degree each, and the corresponding degree distribution is defined as in (25). 
 
Hence, the limiting graph is a complete graph Kn+1 of degree k = n+1. Having a complete graph of concepts 
reflects the idea of complete and unbounded associative potential over all the available concepts within the frame. 
To illustrate how the evolution of the process affects the representation of the concepts, we take the examples in 
Figure 1. Let dn be the associative potential of the graph at state n. For instance, two different situations in Figure 1, 
d8 = 4 while in the second case, it is d8 = 6. 
 added as time goes on (d100 = 4 ), although 
the associative potential is the same (d100 = d8 = 4). 
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The convergence of the entropy of the process (19) over time is defined according to different values of (a, b). 
For instance, the entropy tends asymptotically to infinity for the values b = 0.1 and a = 2. This case illustrates the 
divergence of the entropy proposed in (20), and which seems to be different from the entropy of the limiting 
distribution P1. It is obvious that the entropy of the limiting distribution is null (H(P1) = 0), which asserts the 
certainty of the agent with regard to the final phase of the cognitive process. However, given (20), we can note that 
the certainty of the overall process cannot be deduced by considering all the successions of cognitive updates that 
the agent is performing. Indeed, even though we are certain that the final limiting configuration P1 is going to be 
achieved by the agent, we can not deduce this certainty from observing the overall process. 
5. Conclusion 
We provided a cognitive model for concepts representation as well as their underlying associations by adopting 
an undirected graph structure. The provided topology reflects the complexity of the conceptual graph. Furthermore, 
the proposed model describes a cognitive process where an agent is updating the concepts and the associations. We 
evaluated the uncertainty of the overall process with respect to the entropy measure over countably infinite set of 
concepts. The results include an interpretation of the evolution of process. Thus, we proved that the larger the 
cognitive space is, and the more uncertain the evolution of the process can be, despite the certainty of the final 
outcome. This situation recalls the problem of infinite regress as well as the frame problem, in the sense that we 
incorporated the concept of infinity while reasoning about cognition. As an important research issue to be further 
investigated, we think about considering the direction of the concepts activation. This case demands a separation 
between pertinent concepts and referential concepts. Another issue to be addressed is to fully characterize the 
]. 
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